Chapman University

Chapman University Digital Commons
ESI Working Papers

Economic Science Institute

2015

Asymmetric and Endogenous Communication in
Competition between Groups
Timothy N. Cason
Purdue University

Roman Sheremeta
Chapman University

Jingjing Zhang
University of Technology Sydney

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers
Recommended Citation
Cason, T.N., Sheremeta, R., & Zhang, J. (2015). Asymmetric and endogenous communication in competition between groups. ESI
Working Paper 15-01. Retrieved from http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Economic Science Institute at Chapman University Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in ESI Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Chapman University Digital Commons. For more information, please
contact laughtin@chapman.edu.

Asymmetric and Endogenous Communication in Competition between
Groups
Comments

Working Paper 15-01

This article is available at Chapman University Digital Commons: http://digitalcommons.chapman.edu/esi_working_papers/2

Asymmetric and Endogenous Communication in Competition
between Groups
Timothy N. Cason a
Roman M. Sheremeta b
Jingjing Zhang c
a

Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University,
403 W. State St., West Lafayette, IN 47906, U.S.A.
b
Department of Economics, Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve
University, 11119 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, OH 44106, U.S.A.
Economic Science Institute, Chapman University,
One University Drive, Orange, CA 92866
c
Economics Discipline Group, University of Technology Sydney,
PO Box 123, Broadway NSW 2007 Sydney, Australia

January 27, 2015
Abstract
Costless pre-play communication has been shown to effectively facilitate within-group
coordination. However, in competitive coordination games, such as rent-seeking contests, better
within-group coordination leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency. We report
an experiment in which two groups compete in a weakest-link contest by expending costly
efforts. We find that allowing within-group communication makes groups compete more
aggressively. When only one group can communicate, the communicating group coordinates
better and expends higher efforts than the non-communicating group. However, the
communicating group earns payoffs that are not different from the baseline contest without any
communication, while the non-communicating group earns lower payoffs than in this baseline
contest. Allowing within-group communication in both groups leads to even more aggressive
competition and the lowest payoffs to both groups. Despite such a “harmful” effect of
communication, groups vote to endogenously open communication channels even though this
leads to lower payoffs and efficiency.
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1. Introduction
Many experimental studies have shown that cheap talk can facilitate coordination on the
efficient equilibrium in experimental games with Pareto-ranked equilibria (Cooper et al., 1992;
Charness, 2000; Charness and Grosskopf, 2004; Duffy and Feltovich, 2002, 2006). For example,
Van Huyck et al. (1993) demonstrate that pre-play communication is efficiency-enhancing in
coordination games. Blume and Ortmann (2007) find that costless nonbinding messages, even
when they have minimal information content, can facilitate quick convergence to the Paretoefficient equilibrium. Since many economic interactions can be modeled as coordination games,
this finding may have a very important general implication: improving communication in
coordination games can increase efficiency and social welfare. However, this conclusion is
misleading. Indeed, Cason et al. (2012) show that allowing within-group communication in
competitive coordination games, such as rent-seeking contests, may lead to more aggressive
competition between groups and lower efficiency. Therefore, introduction of within-group
communication in such environments may actually cause inefficiency and decrease social
welfare.
This study further explores potentially harmful effects of communication in competitive
coordination games, by addressing two questions. The first question concerns with the effects of
asymmetric communication: If only one of the two competing groups can communicate, is such
asymmetric communication harmful? The second question concerns with the endogenous
emergence of communication: Given that communication may potentially harm efficiency, do
groups still choose to establish the “harmful” communication channel? To answer these
questions, we employ a weakest-link contest between two groups.
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The weakest-link contest combines features of a cooperative weakest-link game (Van
Huyck et al., 1990) and a competitive rent-seeking contest (Tullock, 1980). One key
characteristic of this type of contest is that coordination on higher efforts increases the
probability of winning the prize, thus receiving potentially higher payoffs. Efforts are aggregated
within each group with a weakest-link production technology, so the effective group effort
equals the lowest effort expended by an individual in the group. The weakest-link feature of this
contest resembles many real life competitions where the performance of the entire group depends
on the worst performer within a group (Hirshleifer, 1983). For example, in many teamwork
competitions each member of the team is responsible for a specific task. If any of the members
performs their task poorly then the team loses the competition. Certain R&D competitions have
such characteristics. In many sports, such as football and basketball, the weakest player on the
team is likely to be a point of attack by the opponents. Also, in terrorist attacks and in some
military battles, the attacker's objective is often to successfully attack one target, rather than a
subset of targets (Clark and Konrad, 2007; Deck and Sheremeta, 2012).
Another key feature of the weakest-link contest is that, although coordination on higher
efforts increases the probability of winning the prize, it also decreases the competitors’ payoffs.
Therefore, higher efforts in this type of competition between groups may lead to lower efficiency
due to the negative externality imposed on the competing group. This unique feature of the group
contest has been used by researchers to examine questions about punishment and retaliation
(Abbink et al., 2010), rent-seeking (Ahn et al., 2011), group structure (Sheremeta, 2011), and
leadership (Eisenkopf, 2014).1 Previous studies have shown that when there is no within-group
communication, group members are able to achieve a substantial level of coordination within
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For a comprehensive review of these studies see Dechenaux et al. (2015). Most contest studies find that subjects
behave more aggressively than predicted and their behavior is heterogeneous (Sheremeta, 2013).
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each group (Sutter and Strassmair, 2009; Cason et al., 2012; Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori, 2012).
Allowing within-group communication leads to even better coordination, but as a result of more
aggressive competition it also leads to lower efficiency (Cason et al., 2012; Leibbrandt and
Sääksvuori, 2012).2
Our experiment employs a weakest-link contest to further explore the potentially harmful
effects of communication in competitive coordination games. Regarding to the first question of
asymmetric communication, we find that when only one group can communicate, the
communicating group coordinates better and expends higher efforts than the non-communicating
group. As a result, the communicating group earns similar payoffs than the group in the baseline
contest without any communication, while the non-communicating group earns lower payoff
than the group in this baseline contest. Allowing within-group communication in both groups
leads to even more aggressive competition and the lowest average payoffs to both groups.
Therefore, it appears that although asymmetric within-group communication is not as harmful as
symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relative
to the case when no groups can communicate. We use content analysis to analyze why
communication is harmful and find that subjects often send messages expressing their desire to
compete and win (significantly more so than messages about cooperation) and messages
expressing verbal bullying and punishment. Moreover, such messages are positively and
significantly correlated with effort expenditures in the contest. These types of communication
patterns partially explain overly aggressive competition in the presence of communication.
Regarding to the second question of endogenous emergence of communication, we find
that groups endogenously choose to establish communication channels. Moreover, as in the

2

Although Sutter and Strassmair (2009) also document that communication within groups increases individual
efforts, such efforts lead to higher payoffs and higher efficiency due to their design.
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exogenous case, endogenously selected communication enhances coordination, but it also leads
to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency. Therefore, we find that although
communication harms efficiency, groups still choose to communicate. We provide several
explanations, suggesting that people naturally have preferences for communication and they do
not realize that communication may actually harm their monetary payoffs. Also, we find
evidence that subjects frequently talk about winning, which suggests that some may choose to
communicate in order to increase their non-monetary utility of winning. Finally, we hypothesize
that choosing to communicate may be rational if subjects’ objective is to maximize their own
payoff relative to the opponents’ group payoff or if they want to strengthen their group identity.

2. Theory and Predictions
2.1. Theoretical Model
Consider a contest between two groups 𝐴 and 𝐵. Each group consists of 𝑁 risk-neutral
players. Neither players in group 𝐴 nor players in group 𝐵 can communicate. This corresponds to
our baseline NC-NC treatment in which “no communication” is allowed. All players within each
group simultaneously and independently expend irreversible and costly individual efforts 𝑥𝑖𝐴 and
𝑥𝑖𝐵 . Players within the winning group each receive the valuation of a prize 𝑣. Players within the
losing group receive no prize. The total effective effort of each group depends on the lowest
effort chosen by a member within the group – the so-called weakest-link. Group efforts
determine winning probabilities using the Tullock (1980) lottery contest success function.
Therefore, the probability of group 𝐴 (similarly group 𝐵) winning the prize is defined as:
𝑝𝐴 (𝑥𝑖𝐴 , 𝑥−𝑖𝐴 ) = min{𝑥

min{𝑥1𝐴 ,…,𝑥𝑁𝐴 }
1𝐴 ,…,𝑥𝑁𝐴 } + min{𝑥1𝐵 ,…,𝑥𝑁𝐵 }
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(1)

That is, each group’s probability of winning depends on the lowest effort within that group
relative to the sum of the lowest efforts by both groups (groups win with equal probability if they
both have a lowest effort equal to 0). The expected payoff for player 𝑖 in group 𝐴 (similarly
group 𝐵) can be written as:
𝜋𝑖𝐴 (𝑥𝑖𝐴 , 𝑥−𝑖𝐴 ) = 𝑝𝐴 (𝑥𝑖𝐴 , 𝑥−𝑖𝐴 )𝑣 − 𝑥𝑖𝐴 .

(2)

Maximizing (2) with respect to 𝑥𝑖𝐴 and solving the (symmetric) best response functions
simultaneously gives the theoretical predictions for this contest. Since this game is a coordination
game, there exist multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria in which the players within the same
group match their efforts at the same level while best responding to the effort of the other group
(Sheremeta, 2011; Cason et al., 2012; Lee, 2012). In particular, in any equilibrium, all players in
each group best respond to the effort of the other group according to the following best-response
functions (correspondences): 𝑥𝐴 ≤ √𝑥𝐵 𝑣 − 𝑥𝐵 and 𝑥𝐵 ≤ √𝑥𝐴 𝑣 − 𝑥𝐴 . These best-response
functions are shown in Figure 1. Moreover, because of the weakest-link technology for
aggregating individual efforts, in equilibrium all players in each group must match their effort
levels, i.e. 𝑥𝑖𝐴 = 𝑥𝐴 for all 𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗𝐵 = 𝑥𝐵 for all 𝑗. The full set of pure strategy Nash equilibria
are illustrated by the intersection of two best-response functions and are shown in Figure 1. Two
specific equilibria of interest are the group Pareto dominant equilibrium and the Pareto efficient
equilibrium. The group Pareto dominant equilibrium may be focal because the players within a
group have incentives to coordinate with each other to increase their effort levels at any other
equilibrium within the shaded area. At the group Pareto dominant equilibrium all players expend
efforts of 𝑣/4 and no group has any incentive to deviate. On the other hand, the Pareto efficient
equilibrium is when all players expend 0. In this equilibrium there is no dead weight loss from
competition and each group is equally likely to win the contest. Note that any symmetric or
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asymmetric equilibrium within the shaded area in Figure 1 is more efficient than the group
Pareto dominant equilibrium and less efficient than the Pareto efficient equilibrium.
Next, consider a contest in which players within group 𝐴 and players within group 𝐵 can
communicate. This corresponds to the C-C treatment in the experiment. The results in the
existing literature suggest that the communicating group usually acts cooperatively as one player
(Sutter and Strassmair, 2009; Zhang, 2009; Cason et al, 2012).3 In such a case, the objective
function of group 𝐴 (similarly group 𝐵) can be written as:
𝜋𝐴𝑐 (𝑥𝐴 , 𝑥−𝐴 ) = 𝑝𝐴 (𝑥𝐴 , 𝑥−𝐴 )𝑣 − 𝑥𝐴

(3)

Therefore, the contest between two groups reduces effectively to a contest between two
unitary players, with the objective functions of groups 𝐴 and 𝐵 given by (3). Maximizing (3)
with respect to 𝑥𝐴 , we find that group 𝐴 best responds to the effort of group 𝐵 according to the
following best-response functions: 𝑥𝐴 = √𝑥𝐵 𝑣 − 𝑥𝐵 . Similarly, for group 𝐵 the best response
function is 𝑥𝐵 = √𝑥𝐴 𝑣 − 𝑥𝐴 . These best-response functions are shown in Figure 2. Assuming
that all players within each group act cooperatively as one player and solving the best response
functions simultaneously gives us a unique Nash equilibrium where all players in each group
match their efforts at the same level, i.e. 𝑥𝑖𝐴 = 𝑥𝐴 = 𝑥𝑗𝐵 = 𝑥𝐵 = 𝑣/4 for all 𝑖 and 𝑗. This Nash
equilibrium is illustrated by the intersection of two best-response functions in Figure 2. Note that
this is exactly the same as the group Pareto dominant equilibrium in the case when neither
groups 𝐴 or 𝐵 can communicate (see Figure 1), and is also the standard equilibrium in the twoplayer Tullock contest.4

3

One of the reasons why communication is such a powerful coordination device is that it creates group identity
(Sutter, 2009; Cason et al, 2012). Chen and Li (2009) provide an excellent literature review on group identity.
4
The group Pareto dominant equilibrium is also a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987).
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Finally, consider a contest in which players within group 𝐴 can communicate, while
players in group 𝐵 cannot. This corresponds to the C-NC treatment in which “communication” is
allowed in one group but “no communication” is allowed in the other group. In this case it is
plausible that the communicating group 𝐴 acts as one player trying to maximize the objective
function (3), while all players in the non-communicating group 𝐵 maximize the objective
function (2). Obviously, in any equilibria 𝑥𝑖𝐴 = 𝑥𝐴 for all 𝑖 and 𝑥𝑗𝐵 = 𝑥𝐵 for all 𝑗 . If
communication resolves coordination problem in group 𝐴, group 𝐴 will respond to the effort of
group 𝐵 according to the best-response function 𝑥𝐴 = √𝑥𝐵 𝑣 − 𝑥𝐵 (this is exactly the same bestresponse function as in a standard two-player Tullock contest). On the other hand, due to
possible miscoordination, players in group 𝐵 have a less precise best-response to the effort of
group 𝐴, i.e. 𝑥𝐵 ≤ √𝑥𝐴 𝑣 − 𝑥𝐴 . The intersection of these best response functions provides the set
of possible Nash equilibria as in Figure 3. Note that the set of Nash equilibria corresponds to the
upward sloping part of the best response function of group 𝐴.

2.2. Predictions
This simple theoretical model and resulting equilibria imply several testable hypotheses
regarding the impact of asymmetric communication. The theoretical prediction for the C-NC
treatment is that players in the non-communicating group should choose identical effort level
between 0 and 𝑣/4, and players within the communicating group should jointly maximize their
payoffs in response to the behavior of the non-communicating group. As demonstrated in Figure
3, such best-response dictates higher effort level than the non-communicating group, although
the range of possible efforts is still between 0 and 𝑣/4. Therefore, regarding the effects of
asymmetric communication, we should expect the following:

7

Hypothesis 1: In the C-NC treatment, efforts of the communicating group are no smaller
than efforts of the non-communicating group.
The theoretical prediction for the NC-NC treatment is that all players within each group
should coordinate on the same effort level, but this level can vary across groups and there is no
strong reason to expect a particular equilibrium effort level between 0 and 𝑣/4. Therefore, when
comparing behavior in the C-NC treatment to the NC-NC treatment, we should expect the
following:
Hypothesis 2: Efforts of the non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment are similar
to efforts of the non-communicating group in the NC-NC treatment.
The theoretical prediction for the C-C treatment is that all players within each group
should choose efforts equal to the group Pareto dominant equilibrium of 𝑣/4. Note that because
the equilibrium prediction for the communicating group in the C-NC treatment lies in the range
between 0 and 𝑣/4, this group should expend effort no greater than the communicating group in
the C-C treatment. Therefore, when comparing behavior in the C-NC treatment to the C-C
treatment, we should expect the following:
Hypothesis 3: Efforts of the communicating group in the C-NC treatment are no greater
than efforts of the communicating group in the C-C treatment.
To summarize, we should observe the lowest aggregate effort in the NC-NC treatment,
followed by the C-NC treatment, and then by the C-C treatment. Since lower efforts imply
higher payoffs (due to the embedded contest structure), we should expect payoffs to be the
highest in the NC-NC treatment, followed by the C-NC treatment, and then by the C-C
treatment. Since efficiency is directly related to payoffs, we should expect the same ranking for
efficiency. This gives our final hypotheses regarding the impact of asymmetric communication:
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Hypothesis 4: Payoffs and efficiency are the highest in the NC-NC treatment, followed
by the C-NC treatment, and then by the C-C treatment.

3. Experimental Design and Procedures
Our principal research questions are about the impact of asymmetric and endogenous
communication on competition between teams. To study these questions, we employed four
treatments as summarized in Table 1: NC-NC, C-C, C-NC, and Endogenous. All treatments
employed 𝑁 = 3 players in each group and all players within the winning group received the
prize of 𝑣 = 60 experimental francs. Subjects were placed into group A or B at the beginning of
the first period, and they stayed in the same group for the duration of the experiment. They also
competed against the same opposing group for all 30 periods of their experimental session. We
chose this fixed matching protocol to allow subjects an opportunity to coordinate with each other
on one of the many different equilibria. Also, because of the fixed matching protocol we
obtained a sufficient number of statistically independent observations to perform reasonably
powerful non-parametric tests.5
At the beginning of each period, each subject received 60 experimental francs as an
endowment (equivalent to $2.00). Effort choices were framed in the instructions using the
standard labels used in voluntary contribution mechanism public good provision experiments:
they could allocate to a “group account” or an “individual account.” The instructions informed
subjects that by allocating 1 franc to their individual account they would earn 1 franc, while by

5

Subjects were informed that the session would last for exactly 30 periods, so the stage equilibrium prediction also
holds for this finitely repeated game. As noted above, we conjectured that groups or individuals might coordinate on
Pareto-improving outcomes in the repeated game, since this is frequently observed in the experimental literature
even in finitely-repeated games with a unique equilibrium (e.g., Selten and Stoecker, 1986).
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allocating 1 franc to their group account they could increase the chance of their group receiving
the reward. Subjects could contribute any integer number of francs between 0 and 60.
The baseline treatment NC-NC implements a contest without communication. In
treatments with communication, before subjects made their allocation decision they had an
opportunity to communicate with other participants via chat windows. In the C-NC treatment,
subjects in one group could send messages to the two other members of their own group
anonymously via this chat window for 60 seconds each period. In the C-C treatment, separate
chat windows were enabled for both groups. For all chat communications we asked subjects to
follow two basic rules: (i) to be civil to one another and not to use profanity, and (ii) not to
identify themselves in any manner. Messages were recorded. After the chat period was over, all
subjects simultaneously made their effort (allocation) decisions, and then a random draw
determined the winning group. A simple lottery was used to explain how the computer chose the
winning group.6 At the end of each period subjects were informed of group A’s and B’s effective
efforts (i.e., the minimum effort in each group).
Note, in the above three treatments, we exogenously vary the communication channel to
measure the causal effect of symmetric and asymmetric communication in the competitive
coordination game. To further explore whether these effects persist when groups can
endogenously choose to enable or disable communication, we implement an endogenous
communication treatment as follows. All subjects began with 10 periods of the NC-NC treatment
to become familiar with the strategic properties of the game. Then three players in each group
voted (before period 11 and before period 21) whether to establish communication for 10

6

Probabilities were explained in the instructions as a number of tokens placed in a bingo cage based on effort
choices, and then one token draw determined the winning individual or group.
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periods.7 Unanimity was required to establish communication channel. After the voting stage, the
computer revealed whether each group elected to communicate during the competition stage.
Therefore, effectively groups could endogenously choose to participate in the NC-NC, C-C, or
C-NC treatment.8 We considered alternative ways of implementing endogenous communication,
such as including explicit costs of opening chat rooms or more frequent votes to open or close
communication opportunities. We chose this 10-period time frame for stationary communication
subgames to strengthen the importance of the communication votes and to reduce potential
spillovers across periods arising from group planning in communication periods for strategies in
non-communication periods (Isaac and Walker, 1991).
The experiment was conducted at the Vernon Smith Experimental Economics
Laboratory. A total of 216 subjects participated in 18 sessions. Subjects were Purdue University
undergraduate students who participated in only one session of this study. Some students had
participated in other economics experiments that were unrelated to this research. Data from the
96 subjects in the NC-NC and C-C treatments were previously reported in Cason et al. (2012) as
the “NOCOMM” and “INTRA” treatments. Results from the additional 120 subjects in the
asymmetric and endogenous communication treatments are newly reported in this study.
The computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). At
the beginning of each session subjects were given the written instructions, shown in Appendix A,
7

Another option was to allow subjects to vote every round to decide whether they want to communicate or not.
However, it would substantially delay the experiment (by about an hour) and it would also create incentives for
subjects to avoid lengthy communications. Another concern is that after subjects choose to communicate after
period 10 (i.e., they end up in the C-NC or C-C treatment), they can devise a future strategy in case when such
communication is not available. However, reading through chats we did not find this to be the case.
8
As we expect that people have a natural tendency to communicate, we adopted a very strict voting rule – groups
must reach a unanimous decision in a single vote to open the communication channel to increase the occurrence of
the endogenous C-NC treatment. It turned out that among the 72 subjects, only 7 subjects voted against
communication in the first voting round and they belonged to 7 different groups. Thus if we had used a majority
rule, we would only observe the endogenous C-C treatment. The second vote before period 21 gives groups another
chance to decide whether they want to communicate. It could provide perhaps the clearest evidence of the
desirability of communication if groups switched from communication to no-communication.
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and the experimenter also read the instructions aloud. At the end of the session, 5 out of 30
randomly-drawn periods were selected for payment. Earnings were converted from experimental
francs into US dollars at a preannounced exchange rate. Subjects earned about $21 on average
and sessions lasted about 60 to 90 minutes.

4. Experimental Results
4.1. Exogenous Communication
The first part of Table 2 summarizes the average group effective (minimum) effort,
individual effort, wasted effort, and payoffs in the three exogenous treatments. Figure 4 displays
the effective group effort over time by treatment. In the NC-NC treatment, average individual
effort should be between 0 and 15. The actual average effort is 11.18, indicating that subjects
learn to coordinate their efforts on substantial level. When within-group communication is
allowed in both groups, as in the C-C treatment, the average individual effort is 20.13. Both the
average and minimum (group effective) efforts are significantly higher in the C-C treatment than
in the NC-NC treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.05, n=m=8). 9 Also, we find that the
amount of wasted effort is significantly lower in the C-C treatment than in the NC-NC treatment
(Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.05; n=m=8).10 Most importantly, because of the greater efforts in
the C-C treatment, the average payoff in the C-C treatment is significantly lower than the payoff
in the NC-NC treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.05, n=m=8). These results have been
previously reported in Cason et al. (2012) and they serve as a baseline for examining how
asymmetric communication impacts behavior in competitive coordination games.
9

All non-parametric tests employ only the independent observations of six subjects. Similar results hold when
considering only the later 20 periods.
10
Wasted effort is calculated by taking the average of the differences between individual effort and the group
minimum effort within each group (Riechmann and Weimann, 2008). Complete coordination is reached when
wasted effort equals zero.
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In the novel C-NC treatment, within-group communication was allowed only in one
group. Our hypothesis is that because of communication efforts of the communicating group
should be no lower than efforts of the non-communicating group. Table 2 shows that in the
communicating group the actual average individual effort is 13.99 and the average group
effective (minimum) effort is 13.56. In the non-communicating group the average individual
effort is 11.30 and effective effort is 8.85. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, both effort measures are
significantly different between the communicating and non-communicating groups (Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p-value=0.02, n=8). Also, relative to the non-communicating group, the
communicating group in the C-NC treatment achieves significantly better coordination (the mean
wasted effort is 0.43 versus 2.45; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value<0.01, n=8). 11 The
communicating group attributed their superior ability to coordinate and make higher efforts to
their chats. In their own words, “i bet we'd be dumb like them if we couldn't talk”; “we r
dominating. still do 5 cuz they're not changing”; “team work is good”.
Result 1: In the C-NC treatment, the communicating group expends higher effort and
achieves better coordination than the non-communicating group.
Comparing treatments NC-NC and C-NC, the non-communicating groups in both
treatments behave very similarly. In particular, in the NC-NC treatment, the average individual
effort is 11.18, the minimum effort is 8.29, and the wasted effort is 2.89. Similarly, in the C-NC
treatment, the average individual effort of the non-communicating group is 11.30, the minimum
effort is 8.85, and the wasted effort is 2.45. For each of these measures, the differences are not
significant between the two treatments, providing support for Hypothesis 2.
Result 2: The non-communicating group in the C-NC treatment expends similar effort
and archives similar coordination than the non-communicating group in the NC-NC treatment.
11

As with other results summarized here, conclusions are unchanged if only later periods are analyzed.
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Comparing treatments C-NC and C-C, the communicating group in the C-NC treatment
expends significantly lower effective effort than the communicating group in the C-C treatment
(13.56 versus 18.86; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.02, n=m=8). This finding is consistent with
Hypothesis 3. Interestingly, we also find that the communicating group in the C-NC treatment
achieves better coordination than the communicating group in the C-C treatment (the mean
wasted effort is 0.43 versus 1.27; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.01, n=m=8).
Result 3: The communicating group in the C-NC treatment expends lower effort and
achieves better coordination than the communicating group in the C-C treatment.
Our final hypothesis concerns how asymmetric communication impacts payoffs. Previous
studies have shown that allowing within-group communication leads to better coordination, but
as a result it can also lead to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency (Cason et al.,
2012; Leibbrandt and Sääksvuori, 2012). Our hypothesis, based on theoretical analysis, is that
asymmetric communication should have a less dramatic impact on payoffs and efficiency. This is
because the non-communicating group cannot compete more aggressively because they lack a
communication channel. In general, however, even though large differences exist in average
individual payoffs across treatments, similar to the large differences in effective effort (Table 2),
the payoff differences are not significant across treatments. This is due, in part, to the lottery
contest success function that introduces substantial noise into individual payoffs. Consistent with
Hypothesis 4, the subjects in the C-C treatment earn significantly less than subjects in the
communicating group in the C-NC treatment, but even this large difference (9.87 versus 20.51)
is only marginally significant (Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.10 n=m=8). As already
documented, though, average earnings in the NC-NC treatment are significantly greater than
those in the C-C treatment (Mann-Whitney test, p-value<0.05, n=m=8).
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Result 4: At marginal (p-value<0.10) significance levels: The communicating group in
the C-NC treatment earns higher payoffs than the communicating group in the C-C treatment and
similar payoffs to the non-communicating group in the NC-NC treatment. The noncommunicating group in the C-NC treatment earns lower payoffs than the non-communicating
groups in the NC-NC treatment.
To summarize, within-group communication causes groups to compete more
aggressively. When only one group can communicate, the communicating group coordinates
better and expends higher efforts than the non-communicating group. However, the
communicating group earns payoffs that are not different from the baseline contest without
communication, while the non-communicating group earns lower payoffs than in the baseline,
non-communication contest. Allowing within-group communication in both groups leads to even
more aggressive competition and the lowest payoffs to both groups. Therefore, it appears that
although asymmetric within-group communication is not as harmful as symmetric
communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency relatively to the
case when no groups can communicate.

4.2. Endogenous Communication
Given that communication harms efficiency, do groups still choose to establish the
“harmful” communication channel? To answer this question, we examine behavior of 24 groups
in the Endogenous treatment. Table 3 summarizes the endogenous communication choices by
periods. In periods 1-10 all 24 groups were assigned exogenously to the NC-NC treatment and
were not allowed to communicate. Before period 11, members of each group voted whether to
open the communication channel for periods 11-20. Overall, 65 out of 72 participants voted to
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open the channel of communication within their groups, resulting in 17 out of 24 groups having
the ability to communicate during periods 11-20.12 Consequently, 2 groups participated in the
NC-NC treatment, 12 groups in the C-C treatment and 10 groups in the C-CN treatment. Before
period 21, members of each group voted again to open the communication channel for periods
21-30. This time, 68 out of 72 participants voted to communicate within their groups, resulting in
20 out of 24 groups having the ability to communicate during periods 21-30.13 Consequently, no
groups participated in the NC-NC treatment, 16 groups in the C-C treatment and 4 groups in the
C-CN treatment.14 Therefore, it appears that the vast majority of participants, and consequently
groups, endogenously choose to have continued access to communication.
Result 5: Majority of groups endogenously and consistently choose to have access to
communication.
The previous section established that communication (implemented exogenously) harms
efficiency. This raises the question: Why do groups still choose to establish the “harmful”
communication channel? One possibility is that perhaps groups vote to communicate because
their behavior is different when communication is chosen endogenously, and thus,
communication does not lead to lower efficiency. The lower part of Table 2 summarizes the

12

Looking at the data from periods 1-10, we did not find any significant difference in group effort, wasted effort and
payoffs between the 7 groups that voted against communication and the 17 groups that voted for communication.
Given that communication is costless and groups have not yet experienced the potential harmful effect of
communication, it is puzzling why these 7 subjects chose not to communicate.
13
Three out of 7 subjects who voted against communication in the first vote continued choosing not to communicate
in the second vote. The 4 groups that switched to communication in second vote all earned less than their opponent
groups during periods 11-20.
14
Only 1 of the 17 groups who communicated in periods 11-20 chose not to communicate in periods 21-30. This
group faced very aggressive competition from the opponent group after communication was enabled and raised
average effort from about 9 tokens in the first 10 periods to an average of 27.8 (compared to 22.3 by their opponent)
in the second 10 periods. Although their average effort was higher than the opponent group, they only won 40% of
the time. In this group, members expressed frustration via chat in period 19 [session 120827_1512, group 2]: “ID6:
sad....” “ID 5: we have lost the last 3”; “ID 4: yeah they have had better odds luck”. In period 20, ID 5 put in 0
tokens deviating from the proposal of “ok do 34 again”. Perhaps as a result of this deviation, ID 6 voted against
communication in period 21. Their opponent group who continued to communicate commented in period 21: “they
don’t communicate lol” “I know” “lol” “stupids” “and put 0 lol” “lets keep this going” “they lose the advantage”.
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average group effective (minimum) effort, individual effort, wasted effort, and payoffs in the
Endogenous treatment. Figure 5 visually shows the comparison between behavior in the
Endogenous and exogenous communication treatments. For average effort, no significant
differences exist between NC-NC and en_NC-NC (8.29 versus 8.17; Mann-Whitney test, pvalue=0.97, n=8, m=12), between C-C and en_C-C (18.86 versus 20.29; Mann-Whitney test, pvalue=0.34, n=8, m=9), between non-communicating groups in C-NC and en_C-NC (8.85 versus
11.08; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.35, n=8, m=7), and between communicating groups in CNC and en_C-NC (13.56 versus 13.29; Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.73, n=8, m=7). Thus, it
appears that what matters is the type of the communication channel, not whether the specific
channel is created exogenously or endogenously. Groups that endogenously choose to
communicate expend similar efforts than groups that are allowed to communicate exogenously.
Similarly to efforts, we find no statistical differences between the average wasted effort
in the Endogenous treatment and exogenous treatments (all p-values are greater than 0.10).15 The
same is true when comparing the average payoffs (all p-values are greater than 0.10).
Result 6: Groups that endogenously choose to communicate expend similar efforts,
achieve similar coordination and earn similar payoffs than groups that are allowed to
communicate exogenously.
Note that as with exogenous communication, endogenously chosen within-group
communication makes groups compete more aggressively. The competition level is moderate
and payoffs are the highest when no group chooses to communicate. When only one group
chooses to communicate, the competition level increases and payoffs decrease for the non-

15

The only exception is the comparison between communicating groups in C-NC and en_C-NC (0.43 versus 1.34;
Mann-Whitney test, p-value=0.07, n=8, m=7).
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communicating group. Finally, when both groups choose to communicate this leads to the most
aggressive competition and the lowest payoffs to both groups.
Despite such “harmful” effects of communication, it is surprising that groups
endogenously and consistently choose to communicate even though this leads to lower payoffs
and efficiency. To further explore the effects of communication and find out why communication
is harmful, we analyze how subjects utilize communication and use content analysis to examine
what kinds of messages are associated with more competitive behavior.

4.3. Analysis of Communication Content
The analysis of communication content is challenging because the qualitative information
exchanged in chats is difficult to quantify objectively. The procedure that we used is becoming
standard in the emerging experimental economics literature that explicitly analyzes how chat
communication affects behavior. First, we randomly selected a session to develop a coding
scheme. A careful analysis of messages in that session resulted in 16 independent categories
shown in Table 4. Then we employed two individuals to code independently all chat room
discussions into the coding categories. The unit of observation for coding was all messages in a
given period within each chat room. If that chat room was deemed to contain the relevant
category of content for that period it was coded as 1 for that category and 0 otherwise. Each unit
was coded under as many or few categories as the coders deemed appropriate. The coders were
not informed about any hypotheses of the study, although they read the experiment instructions
provided to subjects so that they understood the strategic environment the subjects faced.
Coding is subjective so the coders do not always agree on the message classification. To
assess whether a particular type of message meaning is reliably coded, we follow Henning-

18

Schmidt et al. (2008) and Cooper and Kühn (2014) in using a standard approach from content
analysis methodology to adjust the reliability statistic to account for the number of categories
that coders can use for classification. Agreement between the coders can occur by chance,
especially if there are few categories for classification or that type of content is very frequently
or infrequently observed. Cohen’s Kappa (Krippendorff, 2004; Cohen, 1960) is a scaled measure
of agreement that takes a value of 0 when the agreement is consistent with random chance and 1
when the coders agree perfectly. Kappa values between 0.41 and 0.60 are considered “Moderate”
agreement, and those above 0.60 indicate “Substantial” agreement (Landis and Koch, 1977).
Most of our message categories were coded at the “Moderate” or “Substantial” agreement. Some
categories that were classified below the threshold of 0.4, as indicated by italic in Table 4, were
excluded from analysis.
Table 4 displays the average frequency that the coders classified chat room discussions in
specific categories. In all treatments, the most common category coded is “agreement reached
within group” (category C2a), suggesting that 76%-92% of time group members coordinate by
reaching agreement. Also, a considerable fraction of coded chat rooms (30%-40%) include
discussions about using the same strategy over time, i.e., subjects want to “stick with the same
strategy” (category C2g). The fact that subjects often reach agreement and coordinate on a
specific strategy is consistent with Results 1 and 3, which document that within-group
communication improves coordination.
Another category that is frequently coded (17%-38%) is about competition – subjects use
messages to encourage competition and to evoke a desire to win the contest, i.e., “try to
win/compete by raising effort” (category C2d). Finally, it appears from chat messages that
subjects use Cournot belief updating (20%-38%), i.e., they “look back one period” (category
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C1a), and they take into account the behavior of other group members (16%-38%), i.e., they
“make choices by reasoning from the other group's point of view” (category C1c). These
observations suggest that when examining how communication impacts effort in contests, it is
important to control for learning, Cournot updating, and behavior of the opponents.
Table 5 reports estimation results of random effects models of individual effort choices
(Effortt) on previous period effort chosen by the competing group (Othergroup-effortt-1) and the
previous period effort squared (Othergroup-effortt-1^2), to account for the inverted U-shaped best
response reaction function illustrated in Figures 1-3. These models also control for the risk
attitudes inferred from the separate lottery choice task (Risk), the effective effort chosen by that
group in the previous period (Group-effortt-1) and a nonlinear time trend (1/period).16 Finally, all
regressions are augmented with the reliably-coded categories of communication from Table 4.
The estimate on Group-effortt-1 is positive and significant in all treatments and data
subsets, suggesting that individuals learn to coordinate their individual effort to match their
group effort. The estimate on Messages is positive and significant in the Endogenous treatment
(columns 3 and 4), indicating that the more messages subjects send in the Endogenous treatment
the more aggressive is their effort expenditure. In some treatments the estimates on categories
C1a, C1b, and C1c are significant, suggesting that subjects are learning to best respond to the
actions of others. In almost all cases the estimates on categories C2c and C2d are significant but
with opposite signs. This is intuitive: the more subjects send messages about cooperation
Before the subjects played 30 periods of the stage game, we elicited subjects’ risk attitudes using multiple price
list of 15 simple lotteries, similar to Holt and Laury (2002). Specifically, subjects were asked to state whether they
preferred safe option A or risky option B. Option A yielded $1 payoff with certainty, while option B yielded a
payoff of either $3 or $0. The probability of receiving $3 or $0 varied across all 15 lotteries. The first lottery offered
a 0% chance of winning $3 and a 100% chance of winning $0, while the last lottery offered a 70% chance of
winning $3 and a 30% chance of winning $0. At the end of the session, one of the 15 lottery decisions was randomly
selected for payment. Overall, 74% of the subjects are risk averse in both the exogenous and endogenous treatments.
Theoretically it is not clear how risk aversion may impact individual behavior in our game. However, most studies
find that in simple lottery contests more risk-averse subjects choose lower efforts than less risk-averse subjects
(Sheremeta and Zhang, 2010; Shupp et al., 2013; Dechenaux et al., 2015).
16
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(category C2c) the lower is their effort and the more subjects send messages expressing their
desire to compete and win (category C2d) the higher is their effort. Table 4 shows that there are
almost twice as many messages about competition and winning (category C2c) than about
cooperation (category C2d). The fact that subjects spend so many messages emphasizing
competition and winning may help explaining why communication makes groups compete more
aggressively. Finally, note that verbal bullying or punishment (category C4a) is associated with
much greater effort. This suggests that these types of statements, while used infrequently, can
restore higher efforts and promote the aggressive competition seen in the presence of
communication.

5. Conclusion
Recent research has shown that allowing within-group communication in competitive
coordination games, such as rent-seeking contests, may lead to more aggressive competition
between groups and lower efficiency. This study further explores potentially harmful effects of
communication in competitive coordination games, by addressing the questions of (i)
asymmetric communication and (ii) the endogenous emergence of communication. Our
theoretical analysis provides a number of testable hypotheses regarding the effect of
communication on competitive behavior and efficiency. We test these predictions using a
laboratory experiment. The experiment shows that that although asymmetric communication is
not as harmful as symmetric communication, it leads to more aggressive competition and lower
efficiency relative to the case when neither groups can communicate. We use content analysis to
analyze why communication is harmful and find that subjects often send messages expressing
their desire to compete and win. Moreover, such messages are positively and significantly
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correlated with effort expenditures in the contest. These types of communication patterns can
help explain overly aggressive competition in the presence of communication. The experiment
also reveals that despite the “harmful” effect of communication, groups endogenously and
consistently choose to communicate even though this leads to lower payoffs and efficiency.
The results of our experiment indicate that both groups can increase their payoffs by
restricting within-group communication. However, the question is why groups, instead of
restricting their communication channel, choose to communicate, thus aggravating competition
and lowering efficiency?
One possible explanation is that the desire to communicate is hard-wired into people.
Researchers in communication studies identify several main reasons why people communicate:
people communicate to engage and persuade others, and to seek and provide information and to
express emotions like frustration, joy, or disappointment. Especially when people face tasks that
involve conflicts and competition, communication is one of the most sought-after ways to settle
conflict (Cragan and Wright, 1990). In our experiment, in the vast majority of cases all three
group members are engaged in communication by sending messages and on average each subject
sends about 2-3 message lines in a given communication period. Communication is used
effectively to coordinate own member’s efforts to compete against the opponent group.
Moreover, subjects mainly express positive attitude regarding the opportunity to communicate
(See Table 4). Second, it is possible that subjects’ objectives are not only monetary. Sheremeta
(2010) finds that subjects are willing to incur monetary costs to be announced as winners. 17
Others find that status may be important (Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011; Charness et al., 2014).
Similarly, we find that subjects frequently talk about winning and such messages lead to more

17

This finding has been replicated by Price and Sheremeta (2011, 2014), Brookins and Ryvkin (2014) and Mago et
al. (2015).
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aggressive competition. In some cases the chat messages indicate that subjects were willing to
forgo payoffs for the joy of winning: “we might earn 10 francs less, but we can increase chances
of winning”. Therefore, if winning is a component of individual utility, then subjects, who may
even be perfectly aware of harmful effects of communication, may still choose to communicate
in order to increase their utility of winning.18 Related to this argument is the idea that instead of
maximizing individual payoff, a subject may want to maximize his/her payoff relative to the
opponent’s payoff (also known as an evolutionary stable strategy). Indeed, some studies provide
evidence for such behavior in contests (Mago et al., 2015). Therefore, choosing to communicate
can be a dominant strategy, since communicating group in the C-NC treatment receives higher
payoff than the non-communicating group. Finally, it is possible that communication increases
saliency of group identity (Chen and Li, 2009; Sutter, 2009), and subjects may prefer to
communicate in order to strengthen their group identity. Messages that highlight collective group
goals and common group identity, strengthen group-based norms and manipulate the perceptions
of the in-group and out-group are often observed in our experiment (e.g., “don’t be selfish” “our
group rocks”; “wow group b is stupid”; “.it was good working with you guys”).
The bulk of literature in cheap talk communication builds upon findings from
experiments where the choice of communication is exogenous. However in reality whether or not
to communicate is most often an endogenous choice of individuals. There are only a handful of
papers exploring the effect of endogenous communication on coordination and all of them focus
on costly communication (Andersson & Holm, 2010 & 2013; Kriss et al. 2012). The main
message from this small strand of literature is that efficient coordination is reduced because
people choose to communicate too little even when the communication costs are small relative to

18

Indeed, we find that in the C-NC treatment, the communicating group wins significantly more often than the noncommunicating group.
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the communication gain. It will be interesting to see whether imposing a small communication
cost in our experiment will prevent groups from talking too much and increase efficiency in our
competitive coordination game. The experimental environment implemented the classical
Tullock model of rent-seeking, which has been widely used to model incentives for competing
interest groups to influence public policy. While more confident conclusions await further
research, we can note preliminary implications of our results for this setting. In particular, our
findings indicate that both symmetric and asymmetric within-group communication results in
greater wasteful rent-seeking. Drawing on results from Sutter and Strassmair (2009) and
Sheremeta (2011), we conjecture that other mechanisms to aggregate individual efforts into
group contests would also result in increased efforts when groups can communicate. Our general
conjecture is that in group rent-seeking contests, similar to the one studied in this paper,
mechanisms such as communication that lead to better within-group coordination will reduce
efficiency. Future research can investigate how robust our findings are when the best-shot or
summation (perfect-substitutes) technology is used within groups instead of the weakest-link
effort aggregation rule (Abbink et al., 2010; Sheremeta, 2011; Chowdhury et al., 2013). We
chose to focus on the weakest-link rule in the present study, since it affords subjects the ability to
unilaterally reduce their group’s choice, increasing the chances that some group members would
reduce the excessive effort expenditures and improve efficiency. Groups uniformly fail to take
advantage of this opportunity, and given the opportunity, they endogenously choose to
communicate which leads to more aggressive competition and lower efficiency.

24

References
Abbink. K., Brandts, J., Herrmann, B., & Orzen, H. (2010). Inter-Group Conflict and IntraGroup Punishment in an Experimental Contest Game. American Economic Review, 100,
420-447.
Andersson, O. & Holm, H., (2010). Endogenous communication and tacit coordination in market
entry games – an explorative experimental study. International Journal of Industrial Organization
28, 477-495.
Andersson, O. & Holm, H., (2013). Speech is Silver; Silence is Golden, Games, 4, 497-507.
Ahn, T.K., Isaac, R.M., & Salmon, T.C. (2011). Rent seeking in groups. International Journal of
Industrial Organization, 29, 116-125.
Bernheim, B.D., B, Peleg, & M.D., Whinston, (1987). Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria I.
Concepts. Journal of Economic Theory, 42, 1-12.
Blume, A., & Ortmann, A. (2007). The effects of costless pre-play communication: Experimental
evidence from games with Pareto-ranked equilibria. Journal of Economic Theory, 132, 274290.
Brookins, P. & Ryvkin, D. (2014). An Experimental Study of Bidding in Contests of Incomplete
Information. Experimental Economics, 17, 245-261.
Cason, T.N., Sheremeta, R.M. & Zhang, J. (2012). Communication and Efficiency in
Competitive Coordination Games. Games and Economic Behavior, 76, 26-43.
Charness, G. (2000). Self-Serving Cheap Talk: A Test Of Aumann's Conjecture. Games and
Economic Behavior, 33, 177-194.
Charness, G., & Grosskopf, B. (2004). What makes cheap talk effective? Experimental evidence.
Economics Letters, 83, 383-389.
Charness, G., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M.C. (2014). The dark side of competition for status.
Management Science, 60, 38-55.
Chen, Y. & Li, X. (2009). Group identity and social preferences. American Economic Review,
99, 431-457.
Chowdhury, S.M., Lee, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Top Guns May Not Fire: Best-Shot
Group Contests with Group-Specific Public Good Prizes. Journal of Economic Behavior and
Organization. 92, 94-103.
Clark, D.J., & Konrad, K.A. (2007). Asymmetric Conflict: Weakest Link against Best Shot.
Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, 457-469.
Cohen, J. (1960). A Coefficient of Agreement for Nominal Scales. Educational and
Psychological Measurement, 20, 37-46.
Cooper, D.J., & Kühn, K.U. (2014) Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion,
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 6, 247-278.
Cooper, R., De Jong, D., Forsythe, R., & Ross, T. (1992). Communication in coordination
games. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 739–771.
Cragan, J.F., & Wright, D.W. (1991). Communication in small group discussions: An integrated
approach (3rd ed). St. Paul, MN: West.
Dechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). A Survey of Experimental Research
on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments. Experimental Economics, forthcoming.
Deck, C., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2012). Fight or flight? Defending against sequential attacks in the
game of Siege. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 56, 1069-1088.
Duffy, J., & Feltovich, N. (2002). Do actions speak louder than words? Observation vs. cheap
talk as coordination devices. Games and Economic Behavior, 39, 1-27.
25

Duffy, J., & Feltovich, N. (2006). Words, deeds and lies: Strategic behavior in games with
multiple signals. Review of Economic Studies, 73, 669-688.
Eisenkopf, G. (2014). The Impact of Leadership Incentives in Intergroup Contests. European
Economic Review, 67, 42-61.
Fischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich Toolbox for Ready-made Economic experiments.
Experimental Economics, 10, 171-178.
Henning-Schmidt, H., Li, Z.-Y. & Yang, C. (2008) Why People Reject Advantageous Offers—
Non-Monotonic Strategies in Ultimatum Bargaining: Evaluating a Video Experiment Run in
PR China. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 65, 373-384.
Hirshleifer, J. (1983). From Weakest Link to Best-Shot: The Voluntary Provision of Public
Goods. Public Choice, 41, 371-386.
Holt, C.A., & Laury, S.K. (2002). Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects. American Economic
Review, 92, 1644-1655.
Isaac, R.M. & Walker, J. (1991). Costly Communication: An Experiment in a Nested Public
Goods Problem. in Contemporary Laboratory Research in Political Economy, T. Palfrey
(ed.). Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press.
Kosfeld, M. & Neckermann, S. (2011). Getting More Work for Nothing? Symbolic Awards and
Worker Performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3, 86-99.
Krippendorff, K. (2004). Content Analysis: An Introduction to Its Methodology, Sage
Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA.
Kriss, P.H., Blume, A. & Weber, R. (2012) Organizational Coordination with Decentralized
Costly Communication; Carnegie Mellon University: Pittsburgh, PA, USA, unpublished.
Landis, J.R. & Koch, G. (1977). An Application of Hierarchical Kappa-Type Statistics in the
Assessment of Majority Agreeement among Multiple Observers, Biometrics, 33. 363-374.
Lee, D. (2012). Weakest-link contests with group-specific public good prizes. European Journal
of Political Economy, 28, 238-248.
Leibbrandt, A., & Sääksvuori, L. (2012). Communication in intergroup conflicts. European
Economic Review, 56, 1136-1147.
Mago, S.D., Savikhin, A.C. & Sheremeta, R.M. (2015). Facing Your Opponents: Social
Identification and Information Feedback in Contests. Journal of Conflict Resolution,
forthcoming.
Price, C.R., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Endowment Effects in Contests. Economics Letters, 111,
217-219.
Price, C.R., & Sheremeta, R.M. (2014). Endowment Origin, Demographic Effects and Individual
Preferences in Contests. Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming.
Riechmann, T., & Weimann J. (2008). Competition as a Coordination Device: Experimental
Evidence from a Minimum Effort Coordination Game. European Journal of Political
Economy, 24, 437-454.
Selten, R., & Stoecker, R. (1986). End behavior in sequences of finite Prisoner's Dilemma
supergames: A learning theory approach. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 7,
47-70.
Sheremeta, R.M. (2011). Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between
Groups. Korean Economic Review, 27, 5-32.
Sheremeta, R.M. (2013). Overbidding and heterogeneous behavior in contest experiments.
Journal of Economic Surveys, 27, 491-514.

26

Sheremeta, R.M., & Zhang, J. (2010). Can groups solve the problem of over-bidding in contests?
Social Choice and Welfare, 35, 175-197.
Shupp, R., Sheremeta, R.M., Schmidt, D., & Walker, J. (2013). Resource allocation contests:
Experimental evidence. Journal of Economic Psychology, 39, 257-267.
Sutter, M. (2009). Individual Behavior and Group Membership: Comment. American Economic
Review, 99, 2247-2257.
Sutter, M., & Strassmair, C. (2009). Communication, cooperation and collusion in team
tournaments - An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 66, 506-525.
Tullock, G. (1980). Efficient Rent Seeking. In James M. Buchanan, Robert D. Tollison, Gordon
Tullock, (Eds.), Toward a theory of the rent-seeking society. College Station, TX: Texas
A&M University Press, pp. 97-112.
Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., & Beil, R.O. (1990). Tacit coordination games, strategic
uncertainty, and coordination failure. American Economic Review, 80, 234-248.
Van Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., & Beil, R.O. (1993). Asset markets as an equilibrium selection
mechanism: Coordination failure, game form auctions, and tacit communication. Games and
Economic Behavior, 5, 485-504.
Zhang, J. (2009). Communication in Asymmetric Group Competition over Public Goods,
McMaster University, Working Paper.

27

Figure 1: Nash equilibria when neither group A nor group B can communicate (NC-NC)

Figure 2: Nash equilibrium when both group A and group B can communicate (C-C)

Figure 3: Nash equilibria when only group A can communicate (C-NC)
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Figure 4: Effective group effort over time by treatment
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Figure 5: Comparing behavior in the Endogenous treatment to Exogenous treatments
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Table 1: Experimental design of treatments
Treatment
NC-NC
C-C
C-NC
Endogenous

Independent Groups and Subjects
8 Group pairs and 48 Subjects
8 Group pairs and 48 Subjects
8 Group pairs and 48 Subjects
12 Group pairs and 72 Subjects

Table 2: Summary statistics by treatment (all periods)

Treatment

Group Effective
Effort

Exogenous Communication
NC-NC
C-C
C-NC
(non-communicating group)
C-NC
(communicating group)
Endogenous Communication
en_NC-NC
en_C-C
en_C-NC
(non-communicating group)
en_C-NC
(communicating group)
Standard errors shown in parentheses.

Average
Individual
Wasted
Effort
Effort

Individual
Payoff

8.29
(0.12)
18.86
(0.30)
8.85
(0.18)
13.56
(0.23)

11.18
(0.20)
20.13
(0.31)
11.30
(0.23)
13.99
(0.23)

2.89
(0.16)
1.27
(0.14)
2.45
(0.17)
0.43
(0.07)

18.82
(0.81)
9.87
(0.78)
14.20
(1.08)
20.51
(1.09)

8.17
(0.19)
20.29
(0.39)
11.08
(0.30)
13.29
(0.31)

13.50
(0.39)
20.98
(0.39)
15.71
(0.62)
14.63
(0.41)

5.33
(0.35)
0.70
(0.12)
4.64
(0.55)
1.34
(0.25)

16.50
(1.12)
9.02
(1.00)
10.29
(1.93)
19.37
(1.80)

Table 3: Choice of endogenous communication by periods
Group ID
5(A,B), 6(A,B), 9(A,B), 10(A,B), 12(A,B)
1(A,B), 8(A,B), 11(A,B)
2(A,B), 7(A,B)
3(A,B)
4(A,B)

Periods 1-10
(Exogenous)
NC-NC
NC-NC
NC-NC
NC-NC
NC-NC

31

Periods 11-20
Periods 21-30
Endogenous Choice
C-C
C-C
C-NC
C-C
C-NC
C-NC
C-C
C-NC
NC-NC
C-NC

Table 4: Categories for coding messages and observed frequency in chat rooms

Category

Description

Relative Frequency of Coding
Exogenous Communication
Endogenous Communication
C-C
C-NC
C-C
C-NC
Kappa
Kappa
Kappa
Kappa
(Obs 472)
(Obs 238)
(Obs 280)
(Obs 89)

C1
C1a
C1b

Learning and best response
Look back one period
0.20
0.66
Look back at all or some (multiple) past periods,
0.10
0.42
not just last period
C1c
Make choices by reasoning from the other group's
0.26
0.70
point of view
C2
Communication within group
C2a
Agreement reached within group
0.82
0.64
C2b
No agreement reached within group
0.06
0.52
C2c
Try not to compete/cooperate by lowering effort
0.23
0.67
C2d
Try to win/compete by raising effort
0.33
0.55
C2e
Try to match with the opponent group effort from
0.04
0.27
last period
C2f
Try to win/compete by being unpredictable
0.03
0.21
C2g
Stick with the same strategy
0.37
0.82
C2h
Cooperate until the other group defects or until the
0.00
N/A
last period to defect
C2i
Luck
0.10
0.51
C3
Opportunity to communicate
C3a
Positive attitude
0.00
N/A
C3b
Negative attitude
0.00
N/A
C4
Other
C4a
Verbal bullying or punishment
0.03
0.63
C4b
Nothing relevant or fits
0.05
0.56
Entries in italic indicate codes that did not reach the 0.4 Cohen’s kappa reliability threshold.
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0.20
0.12

0.43
0.42

0.30
0.12

0.47
0.59

0.38
0.10

0.38
0.75

0.16

0.52

0.38

0.73

0.19

0.56

0.76
0.07
0.16
0.17
0.01

0.76
0.34
0.59
0.85
-0.01

0.92
0.05
0.19
0.38
0.05

0.57
0.49
0.80
0.73
0.31

0.84
0.06
0.13
0.31
0.03

0.69
0.32
0.85
0.74
0.66

0.03
0.40
0.03

-0.03
0.82
0.41

0.04
0.30
0.01

0.14
0.79
-0.01

0.01
0.32
0.01

-0.01
0.80
-0.01

0.08

0.60

0.09

0.65

0.11

0.59

0.02
0.00

0.53
N/A

0.01
0.01

0.86
0.66

0.06
0.01

0.90
1.00

0.01
0.16

-0.01
0.78

0.01
0.00

0.86
N/A

0.01
0.03

1.00
1.00

Table 5: Effects of communication on individual effort choices (last 20 periods)

Dependent variable, Effortt
Model
Othergroup-effortt-1
[effective effort of other in t-1]
Othergroup-effortt-1^2
[squared effective effort of other in t-1]
Risk
[number of risky options B]
Group-effortt-1
[effective group effort in t-1]
1/period
[inverse of period number t]
Constant

C-C
(1)
-0.08
(0.062)
0.00*
(0.002)
0.05
(0.136)
0.67**
(0.051)
-30.94*
(12.407)
9.36**
(1.968)
-0.25
(0.276)
0.49
(0.800)
-0.61
(0.709)
-0.79
(0.614)
1.75
(1.378)
-3.17
(1.789)
-10.53**
(1.226)
5.66**
(0.986)

Treatment and Data Subset
C-NC
en_C-C
(2)
(3)
0.21
0.16
(0.137)
(0.093)
-0.00
-0.00
(0.007)
(0.002)
0.01
0.16
(0.078)
(0.119)
0.80**
0.61**
(0.053)
(0.034)
-14.26
-44.19*
(10.070)
(19.216)
1.82**
6.75**
(0.690)
(2.617)
0.09
1.13**
(0.232)
(0.224)
0.08
-1.76*
(0.542)
(0.832)
1.17**
-0.95
(0.359)
(0.853)
-2.33**
-1.22**
(0.569)
(0.467)
0.57
-3.60
(1.152)
(2.197)
-5.47
(3.019)
-4.60**
-11.42**
(1.128)
(1.264)
5.13**
10.84**
(0.782)
(1.098)

en_C-NC
(4)
0.63
(0.502)
-0.02
(0.018)
-0.37
(0.323)
0.45**
(0.105)
-1.64
(17.200)
4.97
(3.483)
0.87**
(0.155)
-0.30
(0.225)
-1.00
(0.613)
-0.94
(1.061)
0.28
(1.319)

Messages
[average # of interruption per subject in chat]
C1a
[look back one period]
C1b
[look back at all or some (multiple) periods]
C1c
[make choices reasoning from other's view]
C2a
[agreement reached within group]
C2b
[no agreement reached within group]
C2c
-1.98
[try not to compete/cooperate by lowering effort]
(1.562)
C2d
0.29
[try to win/compete by raising effort]
(0.976)
C2e
0.25
[try to match with the opponent group effort]
(1.300)
C2g
-2.87**
0.40
1.66
0.26
[stick with the same strategy]
(0.617)
(1.095)
(0.929)
(0.922)
C2h
-1.66
[cooperate until the other group defects or the last period]
(0.979)
C2i
0.94
-1.20*
-0.75
0.41
[luck]
(1.065)
(0.583)
(0.580)
(0.585)
C3a
0.32
7.40**
-1.50**
[positive statements about being able to communicate]
(0.822)
(1.276)
(0.538)
C3b
-4.98**
-0.07
[Negative statements about being able to communicate]
(0.678)
(1.318)
C4a
15.27**
16.46**
5.63**
[verbal bullying or punishment]
(1.832)
(1.674)
(1.151)
Observations
936
474
786
249
Number of Subjects
48
24
54
21
* significant at 5%, ** significant at 1%. Standard errors robust to general heteroscedasticity are shown in parentheses.
All models include a random effects error structure, with individual subject effects.

Appendix A (Not for Publication) – Experiment Instructions
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
This is an experiment in the economics of strategic decision making. Various research agencies have provided
funds for this research. The instructions are simple. If you follow them closely and make appropriate decisions, you can
earn an appreciable amount of money.
The experiment will proceed in two parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a series
of economic choices which determine your total earnings. The currency used in Part 1 of the experiment is U.S. Dollars.
The currency used in Part 2 of the experiment is francs. Francs will be converted to U.S. Dollars at a rate of _25_ francs to
_1_ dollar. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 12 participants are in today’s
experiment.
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, or
need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim out
loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 1
YOUR DECISION
In this part of the experiment you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How much you
receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. The decision problems are not designed to test
you. What we want to know is what choices you would make in them. The only right answer is what you really would
choose.
For each line in the table in the next page, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there
are a total of 15 lines in the table but just one line will be randomly selected for payment. You ignore which line will be
paid when you make your choices. Hence you should pay attention to the choice you make in every line. After you have
completed all your choices a token will be randomly drawn out of a bingo cage containing tokens numbered from 1 to 15.
The token number determines which line is going to be paid.
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option A in that line, you will
receive $1. If you chose option B in that line, you will receive either $3 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you
chose option B there will be second random draw. A token will be randomly drawn out of the bingo cage now containing
twenty tokens numbered from 1 to 20. The token number is then compared with the numbers in the line selected (see the
table). If the token number shows up in the left column you earn $3. If the token number shows up in the right column you
earn $0.
Decis
ion
no.
1

$1

$3 never

$0 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

2

$1

$3 if 1 comes out of the bingo cage

$0 if 2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

3

$1

$3 if 1 or 2

$0 if 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

4

$1

$3 if 1,2,3

$0 if 4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

5

$3 if 1,2,3,4,
$3 if 1,2,3,4,5

$0 if 5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

6

$1
$1

7

$1

$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6

$0 if 7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

8

$1

$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7

$0 if 8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

9

$1

$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8

$0 if 9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

10

$1

$3 if 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9

$0 if 10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

11
12

$1
$1

$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11

$0 if 11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20
$0 if 12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

13

$1

$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12

$0 if 13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

14

$1

$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13

$0 if 14,15,16,17,18,19,20

15

$1

$3 if 1,2, 3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14

$0 if 15,16,17,18,19,20

Option
A

Option
B

$0 if 6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20

Please
choose
A or B

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PART 2
YOUR DECISION
The second part of the experiment consists of 30 decision-making periods. At the beginning of the first period, you
will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 3 people: group A or group B. You will remain in the same
group for all 30 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of the first period, your group will be paired with another
group. This pairing remains the same for all 30 periods of the experiment. Either group A or group B will receive a reward.
The reward is 60 francs to each group member.
Each period you will be given an endowment of 60 francs and asked to decide how much to allocate to the group
account or the individual account. You may allocate any integer number of francs between 0 and 60. An example of your
decision screen is shown below.

Your Group

COMMUNICATION
In some periods before they are asked to make the allocation decision, participants may have an opportunity to
communicate with the other two participants in their own group. This communication will consist of messages exchanged
in a “chat area” shown on their computer screen. Any messages sent in this chat will only be viewed by you and the other
two members in your group. The chat time will be active for 60 seconds each period that this communication opportunity is
available. In periods that the communication opportunity is not available, there will be a 60 second break each period before
the allocation decision.
Although we will record the messages you send to each other, your chat id remains anonymous. The first person to
send a message in a period will always be referred to as “member 1”, the second as “member 2” and so on. In sending
messages, you should follow two basic rules: (1) be civil to one another and do not use profanities, and (2) do not identify
yourself in any manner. The communication channel is intended to discuss your allocation choices and should be used that
way.
After the chat period is over, all group members then make their actual decisions simultaneously; you do not learn
the actual allocation decisions of your group members until after you make your decision.
In decision-making periods 1-10 there will be no opportunity for communication. Before period 11 you and the
other two participants in your group will vote to determine whether to communicate each period before making an
allocation in periods 11-20. Only if all three participants unanimously vote to communicate will the chat room be created
for communication. Before period 21 another vote will determine whether you and your group communicate each period
before making an allocation in periods 21-30. Again, communication will occur only if all three participants unanimously
vote to communicate.
Both groups will vote before periods 11 and 21, so in some cases both groups A and B might communicate, in
other cases neither group A nor B communicate, and in other cases only one of the two groups will communicate. Your

decision screen where you make your allocation will always indicate which (if any) of the two groups communicated that
period.

YOUR EARNINGS
After all participants have made their decisions, your earnings for the period are calculated. These earnings will be
converted to cash and paid at the end of the experiment if the current period is one of the five periods that is randomly
chosen for payment.
1)
Your period earnings are the sum of the earnings from your individual account and the earnings from your
group account.
2)
For each franc in your individual account, you will earn 1 franc in return. So, if you keep all 60 francs that you are
endowed with to your individual account you will earn 60 francs. But you can also earn some francs from your
group account.
3)
By contributing to the group account you may increase the chance of receiving the reward for your group. In
determining which group receives the reward, the computer will consider only the lowest contribution in group
A’s account and the lowest contribution in group B’s account. If the lowest contribution in group A’s account
exceeds the lowest contribution in group B’s account, group A has higher chance of receiving the reward and viseversa. In particular, your group’s chance of receiving the reward is
(Your Group’s Minimum Bid)/(Minimum Bid in group A + Minimum Bid in group B)
If both group’s minimum bids are 0, the reward is randomly assigned to one of the two groups.
4)
If your group receives the reward then in addition to the earnings from your individual account you receive the
reward of 60 francs from your group account. A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, by
increasing your contribution, you can increase your group’s chance of receiving the reward.
5)
The computer will assign the reward either to your group or to the other group, via a random draw. So, in each
period, only one of the two groups can obtain the reward.
Example: Random Draw and Earnings
This is a hypothetical example used to illustrate how the computer is making a random draw. Let’s say the
members of groups A and B allocate their francs in the following way.
Table 1 – Allocation of francs by all members in group A and B
If Group
Allocation
If Group
Allocation
Allocation
Allocation
A
to
B
to
Group A
to group
Group B
to group
receives
receives
individual
individual
account
account
reward
reward
account
account
Member 1
60
40
20
Member 1
60
59
1
Member 2
60
45
15
Member 2
60
50
10
Member 3
60
50
Member 3
60
55
5
10
In group A, member 1 contributes 20 francs, member 2 contributes 15 francs, and member 3 contributes 10 francs
to group A’s account. In group B, member 1 contributes 1 franc, member 2 contributes 10 francs, and member 3 contributes
5 francs to group B’ account.
Then the computer chooses the lowest contribution in group A’s account and the lowest contribution in group
B’s account. The two highest contributions in group A and the two highest contributions in group B will not be considered
by the computer. In this example, member 3 has the lowest contribution of 10 francs in group A and member 1 has the
lowest contribution of 1 franc in group B. For each franc of member 3 in group A the computer puts 1 red token into a
bingo cage and for each franc of member 1 in group B the computer puts 1 blue token. Thus, the computer places 10 red
tokens and 1 blue token into the bingo cage (11 tokens total). Then the computer randomly draws one token out of the
bingo cage. If the drawn token is red group A receives the reward, if the token is blue group B receives the reward. You can
see that since group A has more tokens it has a higher chance of receiving the reward (10 out of 11 times group A will
receive the reward). Group B has a lower chance of receiving the reward (1 out of 11 times group B will receive the
reward).
Let’s say the computer made a random draw and group A receives the reward. Thus, all the members of group A
receive the reward of 60 francs from the group account plus they also receive earnings from the individual account. All
members of group B receive earnings only from the individual account, since group B does not receive the reward. The
calculation of the total earnings is shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2 – Calculation of earning for all members in group A and B
Earnings
Earnings
from
from
Total
Group A
Group B
earnings
group
individual
account
account
Member 1
60+40 = 100
Member 1
60
40
Member 2
60+45 = 105
Member 2
60
45
Member 3
60+50 = 110
Member 3
60
50

Earnings
from
group
account
0
0
0

Earnings
from
individual
account
59
50
55

Total
earnings
59
50
55

At the end of each period, the total number of francs in the two groups’ accounts, group which receives the reward,
earnings from individual and group accounts, and total earnings for the period are reported on the outcome screen as shown
on the next page. Please record your results for the period on your record sheet under the appropriate heading.

Outcome Screen
IMPORTANT NOTES
You will not be told which of the participants in this room are assigned to which group. At the beginning of the
first period, you will be randomly and anonymously placed into a group of 3 people: group A or group B. You will remain
in the same group for all 30 periods of the experiment. At the beginning of the first period, your group will be paired with
another group. This pairing remains the same for all 30 periods of the experiment. Either group A or group B will receive a
reward. The reward is 60 francs to each group member. A group can never guarantee itself the reward. However, by
increasing your contribution, you can increase your group’s chance of receiving the reward.
At the end of the experiment we will randomly choose 5 of the 30 periods for actual payment in Part 2 using a
bingo cage. You will sum the total earnings for these 5 periods and convert them to a U.S. dollar payment.

Appendix B (Not for Publication) – Additional Analysis

Figure B1: Distribution of mean effective group effort, mean wasted effort and mean
individual payoff from minimum to maximum according to the medians of the
distributions
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The distributions are represented by box and whisker diagrams for which the left and right edges
of the boxes are 75th and 25th percentiles of the distribution, the ends of the “whiskers” are the
highest and lowest values in the distribution, the vertical bar in the box is the median of the
distribution and the mid-point between the top and bottom edges of the box is the mean of the
distribution.

